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THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974:
EFFECTS ON DELAYS IN FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LITIGATION*
GEORGE S. BRIDGES**
I. THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 was enacted in response to wide-
spread concern regarding the prevention and control of crime as well as
Congress' perception that the public has a right to the prompt disposi-
tion of criminal cases.' The Act was designed to reduce crimes commit-
* Revised version of a paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Society of
Criminology, San Francisco, 1980.
** Assistant Professor of Sociology, Case Western Reserve University. The author would
like to thank Nancy Ames, Mae Kuykendahl, Charles Wellford, and two anonymous review-
ers from the Federal Judicial Center for their comments on earlier versions of this article. The
article would not have been possible without the assistance of James McCafferty of the Ad-
ministrative Office of United States Courts.
I The legislative history of the Speedy Trial Act suggests that the Act's provisions are the
outgrowth of a congressional recognition of a national concern about crime and the control of
dangerous offenders. The Act's provisions represent an alternative to preventive detention of
defendants in federal criminal cases which insures supervision and control of dangerous de-
fendants and speedy trial of criminal cases.
Former Representative Mikva initially introduced the Speedy Trial Act in 1969 as the
Pretrial Crime Reduction Act. He summarized the purpose of this early version as follows:
[T]he Pretrial Crime Reduction Act is an approach to the problems of crime by defend-
ants released prior to trial which does not rely on jailing criminal defendants before they
are found guilty. It provides to the judge alternative methods to insure supervision and
control of dangerous defendants, it provides pretrial services agencies with adequate re-
sources to make those pretrial controls effective, and it insures that defendants are
brought to trial quickly enough that the pretrial controls need be used only for a mini-
mum time.
115 CONG. REc. 34334-35 (1969). The legislative purpose of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974
reflects a concern for the reduction of crime and supervision of defendants. The Act's pur-
pose, as stated in its introduction is "to assist in reducing crime and the danger of recidivism
by requiring speedy trials and by strengthening the supervision over persons released pending
trial and for other purposes." Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076
(1974).
The Speedy Trial Act introduced the concept that a public right to speedy trials exists
independent of defendants' sixth amendment rights. The Act's proponents argue that absent
speedy criminal trials, the criminal justice system loses its effectiveness in protecting the pub-
lic. A. PARTRIDGE, LEGIsLATIvE HISTORY OF TITLE I OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974
(Fed. Judicial Center 1980) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; Ariola, DeMasi,
Loughman & Reynolds, The Speedy Tral Act. An Empirical Stuy 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 713
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ted by defendants in criminal cases released before trial and to
accelerate the processing of federal criminal cases.2 The Act's major
sponsor, Senator Sam Ervin, underscored the need for the Act to combat
delay, stating that the Act is based primarily upon
the premise that the courts, undermanned, starved for funds, and utilizing
18th century management techniques, simply cannot cope with bur-
geoning caseloads. The consequence is delay and .... [t]he solution is to
create initiative within the system to utilize modem management tech-
niques and to provide additional resources to the courts where careful
planning so indicates.
3
To achieve the purpose of accelerating the pace of criminal litiga-
tion, the Act establishes automatic time limits for processing criminal
cases that the court may extend only in accordance with the provisions
of the Act. The Act also requires dismissal of cases not processed within
the prescribed limits.
4
Since passage of the Act, however, the time limits and dismissal
sanction have been the subject of considerable controversy. Many ob-
servers believe that the time limits impose an arbitrary standard for the
disposition of criminal cases, thus reducing the capacity of defense coun-
sel, prosecutors, and the courts to litigate criminal cases effectively.5
Others claim that the time limits work against defendants, particularly
in cases initiated by indictment, by leaving defense counsel inadequate
time to prepare cases. 6 Critics maintain that the Act reduces the effec-
[hereinafter cited as Fordham Stuy]; Frase, The Speedy TrialAct of1974, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 667
(1976); Misner, Delay, Documentation and the .peedy Trial Act, 70 J. CRIM. L & C. 214 (1979);
Steinberg, Dismissal with or without Prefidice under the Speedy Tal Act: A Proposed Interpretation,
68 J. CRIM. L. & C. 1 (1977).
The provisions of the Speedy Trial Act pertain to the processing of defendants in crimi-
nal cases. Throughout the article, the term "cases" refers to defendants in criminal cases unless
otherwise specified.
2 See note 1 supra.
3 120 CONG. REc. 41618 (1974).
4 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a) (1) (2) (Supp. IV 1974). For a discussion of the purposes of the Act
see note I sura.
5 For general discussion and criticisms of the provisions of the Act, see Frase, sura note 1;
Kozinski, That Can of Worms. The Speedy TialAct, 62 A.B.A.J. 862 (1976); Misner, supra note
1; Platt, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974. A Critical Commentag, 44 BROOKLYN L. REv. 757 (1978);
Steinberg, Right to Speedy Ti"L The Constitutional Right and its Applicability to the Speedy TalAct
of 1974, 66 J. CRIM. L. & C. 229 (1975).
For a discussion of the Act's impact on the ability of courts and litigants to process cases
effectively, see Fordham Study, supra note 1, at 644-668; Frase, supra note 1, at 675-76; Misner,
supra note 1, at 223-226; H.R. REP. No. 93-1508, 93d Cong., 2nd Sess. 1-333 (1974); LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note .
6 Defense attorneys have frequently complained that the Act's time limits allow little
time to acquire information necessary for the preparation of an adequate defense. A study of
the Act's effects in three federal districts is representative of defense attorneys' criticisms:
The vast majority of the defense attorneys interviewed in the District of New Jersey
and the Eastern District of New York declared the limits insufficient to prepare an ade-
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tiveness of criminal prosecution. Many believe the Act forces prosecu-
tors to decline or defer--due to their heavy workload-otherwise
prosecutable cases in favor of breaking the Act's time limits in major
criminal cases.7 Still others conclude that the provisions of the Act pres-
sure already overworked courts to achieve unreasonable goals in adjudi-
cating criminal cases.8
A pivotal issue in the controversy over the Act is whether delays in
processing criminal cases have decreased significantly since passage of
the Act. Many courts, prosecutors and defense counsel may prefer
delayed disposition of criminal actions in order to manage litigation ef-
fectively. 9 Some observers believe these participants in litigation cir-
cumvent the purpose of the Act by using its provisions for time
extensions, which were designed to make adjustments for uncontrollable
delays in litigation, and not to accommodate unwarranted delays in liti-
gation.10 Quite certainly, if courts permit delay by granting extensions
of processing time beyond the Act's limits, the Act may have a minimal
impact on the problem of delay.
This article examines federal court compliance with the Speedy
Trial Act since its enactment. The article is the outgrowth of research
on the implementation of the Act in federal courts and offices of United
quate defense. Only two of the sixteen interviewed thought the time limits were ade-
quate for all cases; one of the two, however, handled only simple court-appointed work,
and was thus not likely to experience pressure even under the most restrictive limits. Ten
out of sixteen had not been ready to proceed to trial within the periods fixed by the
courts, and attributed this primarily to the tighter scheduling procedures adopted by
judges to avoid violation of the statutory restraints.
A common complaint was that the limits did not allow enough time to obtain and
analyze what often amounted to thousands of pages of documents, such as financial
records or wiretap transcripts, that the prosecution has spent months collecting and di-
gesting. The problem was aggravated when the prosecution was late in turning over
discoverable materials. Others noted the massive communication difficulties in coordi-
nating defense among several defendants and their counsel in large conspiracy cases.
Fordham Study, supra note 1, at 665.
7 Former Attorney General Saxbe voiced this concern when he opposed the pending
legislation. The Attorney General claimed that the Act's provisions for mandatory dismissal
were not in society's interest, that complicated cases required more time to prepare than the
Act's provisions allowed, and that the rate of guilty pleas would be adversely affected. Mis-
ner, supra note 1, at 224. See also UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DELAYS IN THE
PROCESSING OF CRIMINAL CASES UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974, 24, 29-31 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE STUDY].
8 See note 5 supra. See also N. AMES, K. CARSON, T. HAMMETT & G. KENNINGTON, THE
PROCESS OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974 (As
AMENDED IN 1979) 33-117 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ABT REPORT].
9 For discussion of the interests criminal litigants have in delay, see Misner, supra note 1,
at 219-23.
10 The legislative history also indicates that concerns were expressed early in the develop-
ment of the legislation about the problem of circumvention of the Act's purposes by improper
use of the Act's provisions for excludable delay. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note I, at 149-
150. See Misner, supra note 1, at 216-17.
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States Attorneys. I t Unlike most previous writing on this subject, the
article draws principally upon empirical information collected on de-
fendants in criminal cases processed in the federal courts. The findings
indicate that although federal courts meet the Act's time limits in
processing most cases, the courts have achieved only slight improve-
ments in the actual time elapsed in processing cases. Compliance with
the time limits stems primarily from frequent and effective use of the
Act's provisions for excluding case processing time rather than from sub-
stantial reductions in case processing time. The study findings show
that courts process many criminal cases with no greater speed, in terms
of elapsed calendar time, than prior to enactment of the Act.
II. THE ACT'S PROVISIONS FOR DELAy
The Speedy Trial Act represents a significant effort by Congress to
address the problems of delay in handling federal criminal cases.' 2 The
statutory scheme enacted in 1974 divides the period between arrest and
trial into three distinct intervals: the time from arrest to the filing of a
charge with the court (Interval 1),t3 the time from filing to arraignment
on the charge (Interval 2)14 and the time from arraignment to trial (In-
terval 3).15 The Act also provides that the action be dismissed when the
action exceeds the time limits associated with the intervals. The Act
mandates application of this sanction irrespective of the stage at which
the delay occurs. 16 Although dismissal is mandatory, the court decides
in its discretion whether dismissal is with or without prejudice to
reprosecution. 17
To lend flexibility to the time limits, Congress provided for the ex-
clusion of processing time attributable to circumstances generally be-
yond the control of the courts or counsel from the computation of time
allowed under the limits.'8 The provisions for excluded time are essen-
tially twofold. The first of the provisions is contained in Section
3161h(1)-(7) and involves exclusions for case processing time occasioned
11 See ABT REPORT, supra note 8; DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE STUDY, supira note 7.
12 For a general review of the background of the Act, see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 1; Frase, supra note 1; Lohman, Speedy TrialAct of 1974: Defiing te Sirth Amendment Right,
25 CATH. U. L. REV. 130 (1975).
'3 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (Supp. IV 1974).
14 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c) (Supp. IV 1974).
15 Id.
16 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1), (2) (Supp. IV 1974).
17 Id. For discussion of the issues surrounding the sanction of dismissal, see Frase, supra
note 1, at 704-08; Hansen & Reed, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 in Constitutional Perspective, 47
Miss. L. J., at 415-18 (1976); Steinberg, supra note 1, at 1-14.
18 For comprehensive reviews of the development of the provisions for the exclusion of
case processing time, see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 92-185; Frase, supra note 1, at
689-704, 712-717; Hansen and Reed, supra note 17, at 409-11.
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by specific pretrial litigating activities or events.' 9 The provisions estab-
lish narrow exceptions to the Act's time limits that require automatic
exclusion of case processing time by the court from the computation of
elapsed calendar time. Many of the exceptions pertain to delays result-
ing from litigating activities such as mental competency proceedings,
interlocutory appeals, or motion hearings.20 Court orders or rulings as-
sociated with those activities serve as calendar points for determining
the elapsed time occasioned by the activities. 21 Other exceptions involve
the exclusion of time associated with such factors as the unavailability of
a defendant or an essential witness, or proceedings that are under ad-
19 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)-(7) (1975):
(h) The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within
which an information or an indictment must be filed, or in computing the time within
which the trial of any such offense must commence:
(1) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defend-
ant, including but not limited to--
(A) delay resulting from an examination of the defendant, and hearing on, his
mental competency, or physical incapacity;
(B) delay resulting from an examination of the defendant pursuant to section
2902 of title 28, United States Code;
(C) delay resulting from trials with respect to other charges against the defend-
ant;
(D) delay resulting from interlocutory appeal;
(E) delay resulting from hearings on pretrial motions;
(F) delay resulting from proceedings relating to transfer from other districts
under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; and
(G) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty days, dur-
ing which any proceeding concerning the defendant is actually under advisement.
(2) Any period of delay during which prosecution is deferred by the attorney for
the Government pursuant to written agreement with the defendant, with the approval of
the court, for the purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate his good conduct.
(3) (A) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the de-
fendant or an essential witness.
(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, a defendant or an es-
sential witness shall be considered absent when his whereabouts are unknown and, in
addition, he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution or his whereabouts
cannot be determined by due diligence. For purposes of such subparagraph, a defend-
ant or an essential witness shall be considered unavailable whenever his whereabouts
are known but his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence or he resists
appearing at or being returned for trial.
(4) Any period of delay resulting from the fact that the defendant is mentally in-
competent or physically unable to stand trial.
(5) Any period of delay resulting from the treatment of the defendant pursuant to
section 2902 of title 28, United States Code.
(6) If the information or indictment is dismissed upon motion of the attorney for
the Government and thereafter a charge is filed against the defendant for the same of-
fense, or any offense required to be joined with that offense, any period of delay from the
date the charge was dismissed to the date the time limitation would commence to run as
to the subsequent charge had there been no previous charge.
(7) A reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a co-
defendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance has
been granted.
20 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1) (1975).
21 Frase, supra note 1, at 691.
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visement by the court.22 The Act establishes no clear standards for de-
termining the extent of excluded time associated with these other
factors.
23
The second method of exclusion of processing time permits a court
to continue a case based upon an on-the-record finding that the "ends of
justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the
public and the defendant in a speedy trial."' 24 Even though the Act
establishes specific guidelines that courts must follow in granting such
continuances, it grants courts full discretion in determining the overall
extent of time excluded under the "ends of justice" clause. 25 Some ob-
servers believe this provision may allow courts and litigants too much
flexibility in complying with the provisions of the Act, thus limiting the
Act's overall effectiveness in reducing delays in criminal litigation.26
Recognizing the far-reaching consequences of the Act, Congress
also provided for a gradual phase-in period, beginning on July 1, 1976,27
during which the dismissal sanction would be held in abeyance and
transitional time limits that became progressively narrower would be in
effect.28 The Act was to become fully effective on July 1, 1979, at which
point the time limits would be thirty, ten and sixty days for the three
intervals respectively. The purpose of this graduated implementation
was to mitigate the anticipated effects of the Act on the administration
of justice by giving districts the opportunity to plan for the Act's final
implementation while under increasingly stringent time limits for
22 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(l)-(7) (1975).
23 Frase, supra note 1, at 691-93.
24 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8) (1975).
25 Frase, supra note 1, at 699.
26 Misner, supra note 1, at 226-28. To the extent that courts utilize the "ends of justice"
provision to accommodate unwarranted delays in criminal cases or to alleviate the pressures
of congestion in case processing, courts may circumvent the purposes and provisions of the
Act. The Act (18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(c)) prohibits courts from granting "ends of justice"
continuances to accommodate court congestion.
27 President Ford signed The Speedy Trial Act on January 3, 1975. However, a change in
the implementation schedule of the Act tied all effective dates to July 1, 1976, instead of the
date of enactment. LEGIsLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 20.
28 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (f), (g) (1975):
() Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, for the first
twelve-calendar-month period following the effective date of this section as set forth in
section 3163(a) of this chapter the time limit imposed with respect to the period between
arrest and indictment by subsection (b) of this section shall be sixty days, for the second
twelve-month period such time limits shall be forty-five days and for the third such pe-
riod such time limit shall be thirty-five days.
(g) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (c) of this section, for the first
twelve-calendar-month period following the effective date of this section as set forth in
section 3163(b) of this chapter, the time limit with respect to the period between arraign-
ment and trial imposed by subsection (c) of this section shall be one hundred and eighty
days, for the second such twelve-month period such time limit shall be one hundred and
twenty days, and for the third such period such time limit with respect to the period
between arraignment and trial shall be eighty days.
1982]
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processing criminal cases. 29
At the initiation of the Department of Justice and the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States in the spring of 1979,30 Congress considered
and passed amendments to the Act effecting four major changes. 31 The
amendments (1) merged the interval between indictment and arraign-
ment with the arraignment-to-trial interval, creating one seventy-day
postindictment period;32 (2) postponed the dismissal sanction until July
1, 1980, for cases not meeting the amended time limits of the Act;33
(3) revised the Act's provision for excludable time to include three addi-
tional grounds for exclusion;34 and (4) simplified the procedures by
which the district courts, when unable to comply with the time limits
due to congestion in calendars, may seek temporary suspensions of the
Act's time limits.3 5 Congress intended that the amendments remedy
compliance problems which arose during the initial phase-in period of
implementation without altering the apparatus established to achieve
speedy trials in the federal courts.3 6 The added exclusions for processing
time and the expanded grounds for granting "ends of justice" continu-
ances provided greater flexibility in the overall time limits. Congress'
postponement of the dismissal sanction gave the federal justice system
one full year to experience working under the Act's final limits.
To gain an understanding of factors associated with the Act's effects
on delay in criminal litigation, it is useful to consider briefly the rela-
tionship between statutory compliance with the Act and the problem of
delay in processing criminal cases. Clearly, the manner in which courts
apply the Act's automatic exclusions and "ends of justice" continuances
may affect compliance with the Act's time limits. Because processing
time that falls within one of the Act's exclusions should not count
against the limits, the manner in which courts apply the "automatic"
provisions for excluded time may affect levels of compliance. Similarly,
exclusion of processing time through "ends of justice" continuances may
accommodate significant periods of delay that would otherwise result in
violations of the limits. Compliance with the Act's time limits in a sig-
nificant proportion of cases, thus, may not necessarily reflect efficiency
in processing those cases. Courts and litigants may achieve compliance
with the limits in many instances through frequent application and lib-
29 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 18, 86-89.
30 Id. at 20-21.
31 Speedy Trial Act Amendments Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-43 (1979).
32 18 U.S.C. § 3161(o (1975).
33 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c) (1979).
34 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h) (1) (c), (H), (1) (1979).
35 18 U.S.C. § 3174 (c)(l)-(2), (d)(I)-(2), (e) (1979).
36 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 20-23.
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eral interpretation of the provisions for excluded time.3 7 As a result,
efforts to achieve compliance with the time limits may not reduce
elapsed time in processing criminal cases or the likelihood that litigants
will wait in long queues for court proceedings.
III. THE STUDY
This article is based upon a study of the implementation of the
Speedy Trial Act, with special emphasis on the problems of delay in
criminal litigation. The study primarily relies upon empirical data pro-
vided by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
(AOUSC). The data include district-by-district information on levels of
compliance with the Act's time limits, the use of exclusions and discre-
tionary continuances, and the overall elapsed time from filing to disposi-
tion for defendants in criminal cases. Additionally, information
regarding the general implementation of the Act is drawn from previous
studies and published statistical reports on the operation of Offices of
United States Attorneys and federal district courts.
3 8
Discussion of the study findings is divided into three sections. The
first section reviews annual trends in compliance with the Act's time
limits during the period between July 1, 1976, and June 30, 1981, to
describe changes in compliance that occurred. The second section ex-
amines the application of the provisions for excluded processing time.
The final section discusses effects of the Act on case processing time for
defendants in criminal cases. The study examined processing time
among criminal cases terminated in federal courts since 1971 to ascer-
37 The DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE STUDY found:
[Riepeated and marked inconsistencies in the way in which some of the exclusions are
being interpreted and applied by the courts. In some districts, for example, more than
half of the incidents prompting the exclusion of processing time were attributable to
hearing and deciding pretrial motions, while in other districts these events produced not
one instance of excluded processing time. Similarly, in one district, 80 percent of the
examined cases experienced at least one incident of excluded processing time, while in
another district the figure was only 4 percent.
Experience with the Act's exclusion of processing time when 'the ends of justice'
served by a continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a
speedy trial [18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A)] is particularly instructive. On a national scale,
this category accounts for approximately one-third of all incidents of excluded processing
time. Yet, in one sample district it accounted for two-thirds of excluded incidents and, in
another sample district, almost none.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE STUDY, supra note 7, at 20-23.
38 ABT REPORT, sura note 8; AD. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR (1981); AD. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS, SIXTH REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF TITLE I OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974: TITLE I (1980); AD. OFF. OF THE U.S.
COURTS, FIFTH REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974:
TITLE I (1980); DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE STUDY, sufra note 7; Fordon Stud, .tura note 1.
The analysis of data focuses strictly on the processing of defendants. Throughout the
discussion of findings the term "cases" is used for clarity and ease of presentation, and refers
to defendants in criminal cases unless otherwise specified.
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GEORGE S BRIDGES
tain whether delays in processing have decreased since the enactment of
the Act. To account for factors that may have independently contrib-
uted to increased or decreased processing time during the eleven year
period, changes in the volume and types of criminal cases terminated in
the federal courts are also considered.
A. COMPLIANCE WITH THE ACT'S TIME LIMITS
As noted above, the Act established final time limits that went into
effect in the fourth year of the implementation period. Changes in com-
pliance with the final limits over the five year period measure success in
implementing the provisions of the Act. Table 1 exhibits annual levels
of compliance with the final time limits for criminal cases litigated in
federal district courts between 1977 and 1981. Table 1 shows that levels
of compliance with the limits for the Act's two intervals were relatively
high throughout, particularly in the most recent year.39 At both stages
TABLE 1
NATIONAL LEVELS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE TIME
LIMITS OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT: 1977-1981a
INTERVAL 1 INTERVAL 2
Total Total
Year Defendants % Defendants %
1977b  20157 73.7 46077 75.4
1978b  14644 77.8 41243 73.2
1979 b  14587 81.8 38081 78.9
1980 13193 90.8 32019 88.3
1981 14773 94.2 35358 93.4
a Source: ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE Di-
RECTOR, 1981; ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, SIxTH REPORT ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF TITLE I OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974: TITLE I 1980.
b The 1979 amendments to the Speedy Trial Act revised the time limits by establishing two
intervals for case processing. Before 1980, three intervals were employed. The data
presented in this table describe the trends in compliance with the Act's time limits across
all years with respect to the final two interval scheme.
39 For the remainder of the article, the period from July 1, 1976 to June 30, 1977, will be
referred to as "1977"; from July 1, 1977 to June 30, 1978, as "1978"; from July 1, 1978 to June
30, 1979, as "1979"; from July 1, 1979 to June 30, 1980, as "1980"; and from July 1, 1980 to
June 30, 1981, as "1981".
Tables 1-3 examine trends in compliance with respect to the two stages of prosecution
enacted in the 1979 amendments to the Act. The analysis is presented in this manner---as
opposed to compliance with the three intervals enacted in the original legislation-for two
reasons. First, it facilitates comparison of trends in compliance before and after enactment of
the amendments. Second, comprehensive information on cases processed for each of the five
implementation years was available in this form. One consequence of this approach is that
the analysis examines compliance retrospectively through a scheme of time intervals that
were not in existence before 1980. As a result, levels of compliance reported for Interval 2 are
[Vol. 73
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of prosecution, most cases were processed within the Act's time limits.
Further levels of compliance rose progressively--except for Interval 2 in
1978-over the five year period.
Case processing changes in a small portion of districts may partly
explain these trends. Districts handling a disproportionate share of cases
litigated in all federal courts may have a disproportionate influence on
national levels of compliance. To ascertain whether the high levels of
compliance and changes in compliance over time are associated with
trends in compliance in a few districts, the study examined the number
of districts fully compliant with the Act's limits. Table 2 shows annual
trends in the number and proportion of those districts. The table indi-
cates that relatively few districts achieved full compliance with the Act's
time limits across the first five years of implementation. And despite
TABLE 2
DISTRICTS FULLY COMPLIANT WITH THE TIME LIMITS OF
THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT: 1977-1981a
INTERVAL 1 INTERVAL 2
Total Compliant Compliant
Year Districts Districts % Districts %
19 7 7b 95 10 10.5 1 1.0
1978 b 95 8 8.4 1 1.0
1979b  95 17 17.9 0 -
1980 95 30 31.6 7 7.4
1981 95 39 41.0 21 22.1
a Source: ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE Di-
RECTOR, 1981; ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, SIXTH REPORT ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF TITLE I OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974: TITLE I 1980; AD-
MINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FIFTH REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974: TITLE I (1980).
b The 1979 amendments to the Speedy Trial Act revised the time limits by establishing two
intervals for case processing. Before 1980, three intervals were employed. The data
presented in this table describe the trends in compliance with the Act's time limits across
all years with respect to the final two interval scheme. Fully compliant districts with
respect to the period between indictment and trial before 1980 (Interval 2) are those that
were fully compliant with both Intervals 2 and 3 in the Act's original scheme. Data for
years before 1980 are based upon reported levels of compliance for cases initiated and
terminated during the year in question. As a result, the number of compliant districts for
these years may be somewhat higher than the number for all cases terminated during
those years. Data for 1980 and 1981 are based upon all terminated cases.
constructed from measures of processing time for Intervals 2 and 3 of the Act's original
scheme. While the analysis may be viewed as artificial, it reflects more accurately than other
approaches how effectively the courts performed and improved with respect to the final stan-
dards for case processing imposed under the Act.
Congress established a seventy-day post-indictment period. This gives courts and liti-
gants greater flexibility and more processing time to comply with the Act's limits. Higher
levels of compliance for this period would be expected as a direct result of the limitations
revision.
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large increases in the proportion of fully compliant districts in 1980 and
1981, the proportion remains less than one-half of all districts. Thus,
most districts handled defendants in cases that exceeded the time limits
at one or more stages of prosecution.
In brief, compliance with the Act's time limits was high throughout
the implementation period among most district courts even though rela-
tively few districts complied fully with the limits at each interval of
processing.
B. APPLICATION OF THE ACT'S EXCLUDABLE TIME PROVISIONS
Another essential feature of the Speedy Trial Act is its provision for
excluding time associated with certain pretrial litigating events from the
computation of processing time charged against each interval. The pur-
pose of the provision is to provide courts with the flexibility to accom-
modate serious problems of delay.40 The provisions were also designed
to facilitate normal pretrial preparation in criminal cases where no seri-
ous problems of delay occur.
41
Previous writing on the Act's implementation establishes that indi-
vidual districts apply the provisions for excludable processing time with
great disparity.42 One study indicates, for example, that in some dis-
tricts a fairly large portion of incidences prompting exclusion of process-
ing time is attributed to hearings on pretrial motions.43  In other
districts, a pretrial motion is never the basis for excluding processing
time.44 Also, clerks in some districts automatically apply exclusions by
recording all instances of excluded processing time.45 Other districts,
40 See note 8 & accompanying text supra.
41 The 1974 Senate Report states:
The bill does more, of course, than merely impose prosecution limits on the Federal
criminal trial. It has carefully constructed exclusions and exceptions which permit nor-
mal pre-trial preparation in the ordinary noncomplex cases which represent the bulk of
business in the Federal courts. The bill also accommodates complex cases which require
long periods of preparation by prosecutors and defense counsel. While the bill does not
automatically exclude certain criminal trials by type, it does set forth a method by which
the complex case can be identified. The bill also provides for unusual circumstances
which may demand exceptions to the normal time limits. In order to avoid the pitfalls of
unnecessary rigidity on the one hand, and a loop-hole which would nullify the intent of
the legislation on the other, a balancing test is established in order to enable the judge to
determine when the "ends of justice" require an extraordinary suspension of the time
limits.
S. Rep. No. 93-3021, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 21 (1974), in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at
93.
42 See note 37 supra; ABT REPORT, supra note 8, at 36-50.
43 See note 37 supra.
44Id.
45 ABT REPORT, supra note 8, at 42-48.
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however, exclude time only through court orders.46 Finally, in some dis-
tricts "ends of justice" continuances may account for a significant pro-
portion of excluded incidents. In others they account for almost none.
47
Such disparities among districts may result from confusion and lack
of information among judges, court clerks and prosecutors regarding the
application of the Act's excludable time provisions. In previous studies
judges have admitted confusion regarding how to interpret the Act's
provision for "ends of justice" continuances.48 Clerks experience diffi-
culty in the identification and determination of periods of excludable
time.4 9 Finally, some federal prosecutors may lack familiarity with the
specific provisions of the Act.50
In order to ascertain how the Act's provisions for excluded time
were applied on a national scale for the five year period beginning in
1977, trends in the incidence and prevalence of speedy trial exclusions
were analyzed. Table 3 shows the trends. There was a substantial in-
crease in the absolute frequency of applications of the Act's exclusions
during Intervals 1 and 2 over the five year period. The increase is most
apparent in applications of "ends of justice" continuances. The overall
incidence of application of the continuances rose by a factor of almost
seven in Interval 1 and by a factor just less than three in Interval 2. This
increase occurred amid a significant decline in the number of cases
processed in federal courts. Among defendants with excluded time, the
frequency of applications of excluded time through "ends of justice"
46 Id. at 40.
47 See note 37 sufira; ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, fi/ra note 38.
48 The analysis of cases processed in 18 representative districts and interviews with judges,
prosecutors, defense attorneys and court personnel in six other districts indicates that variant
interpretations of the provision
may also result not from a lack of information but from actual differences in perception
concerning the meaning of these provisions. Thus, in interpreting the provisions of
§ 3161(h) (8), many judges have concluded that the "ends of justice" provision offers a
broad source of justification for delay. Some judges, in fact, have argued that the
amended provision is so sweeping and so full of "loopholes" that it has essentially "gut-
ted the Act." Such observations stem from the position that granting "ends of justice"
continuances represents an evasion of the Act's spirit rather than a legitimate method of
exercising the full flexibility allowable under the law. Nevertheless, these judges' fears
have been supported in some instances. For example, in some districts and courtrooms,
§ 3161(h)(8) is used to justify almost any delay, including many which are covered by
"automatic" exclusions.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, some judges felt that Congress intended "ends
of justice" continuances to be granted only in exceptional cases, that Congress had in
mind a "tight construction." Thus, in some districts the provision for such continuances
is almost never used. In general, despite indications that "ends ofjustice" continuances
are becoming more common, there are still many judges and attorneys who view the
provision in a very restrictive fashion.
ABT REPORT, sufira note 8, at 41. Certainly, confusion among judges was compounded by a
lack of appellate litigation on the Act's provisions.
49 Id. at 42-44.
50 Id. at 39.
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continuances relative to the number of individual defendants also in-
creased. Table 3 shows this increase in terms of the prevalence of "ends
of justice" continuances. The prevalence of such continuances in Inter-
val 2 exemplifies the increase-while sixteen of every one hundred de-
fendants indicted in 1977 had one "end of justice" continuance granted
by the court, thirty-three of every one hundred defendants indicted in
1981 had one "ends of justice" continuance. 51 No increase occurred in
the prevalence of automatic exclusions for Interval 2 and only a slight
increase occurred in their prevalence during Interval 1.
TABLE 3
NATIONAL LEVELS OF INCIDENCE AND PREVALENCE OF
APPLICATION OF SPEEDY TRIAL EXCLUSIONS:
1977-198 la
INTERVAL I INTERVAL 2
Incidence Prevalence' Incidence Prevalencec
-o ,.oa a on o ,
- 0 .- . .-a on.-o
Year Pq X r t C) l ~ <o<~
19 77b 20157 608 39 .13 .01 46077 12913 1758 1.19 .16
1978
b  
14644 504 67 .14 .02 41243 11480 2249 1.14 .22
1979
b  
14587 463 96 .12 .02 38081 10686 3316 1.02 .32
1980 13193 712 191 .15 .04 32019 12210 3593 1.06 .34
1981 14773 986 262 .17 .05 35358 16116 4616 1.16 .33
Source: ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, 1981; ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE U.S. COURTS, SIXTH REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TITLE I OFTHE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974: TITLE I 1980;
AD.MINISTNATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FIFTH REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENrATION OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974:
TITLE I (1980).
b The 1979 amendments to the Speedy Trial Act revised the time limits by establishing two intervals for case processing. Before
1980, three intervals were employed. The data presented in this table describe trends in the incidence and prevalence of cxclu-
sions of casc processing time across all years with respect to the final two interval scheme. Data for years before 1980 are based
upon use of exclusions for cases initiated and terminated during the year in question. As a result, the incidence and prevalence of
exclusions may be slightly lower than the number for all cases terminated during those years. Data for 1980 and 1981 are based
upon all terminated cases. This difference may partly explain the sharp increase in use ofautomatic exclusions between 1979 and
1980.
Prevalence measures the estimated number of incidents of excludd time per defendant among those with excluded time. Inany
one interval, prevalence is the ratio of the incidence ofexclusions to the proportion of defendants in that interval with excluded
time.
Table 4 exhibits the amount of processing time associated with ap-
plication of the provisions for excluded time. The median amount of
excluded processing time increased over the implementation period, al-
though not progressively; and substantial increases occurred in the me-
dian number of days excluded per defendant through automatic
51 Certainly, some of the increase in the incidence and prevalence of applications of the
Act's provisions for excluded time is associated with the 1979 revisions of the Act, adding
three grounds for exclusion of processing time. It is important to keep in mind, however, that
the purpose of this part of the analysis is to determine whether the incidence and prevalence
of applications of the provisions changed over the five year trend. Because courts exercise
considerable discretion in applying and interpreting the provisions, addition of the grounds
for excluded time should not alter interpretation of the trends.
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TABLE 4




Defendants Median Days Median Days Median Days Median Days
with Excluded per per per per
Year Time Incident Defendantc Incident Defendantc
19 7 7b 11013 9.82 12.96 35.62 6.06
19 78 b 10118 9.45 12.10 41.67 10.00
19 79 b 10169 9.70 11.06 48.86 16.52
1980 11760 18.17 21.98 51.96 19.74
1981 13951 21.86 27.76 49.14 18.67
a Source: ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE Di-
RECTOR, 1981; ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, SIXTH REPORT ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF TITLE I OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974: TITLE 1 1980; AD-
MINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FIFTH REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974: TITLE I (1980).
b The 1979 amendments to the Speedy Trial Act revised the categories of pretrial litigating
activities for which processing time may be excluded. Data for years before 1980 are
based upon use of exclusions for cases initiated and terminated during the year in ques-
tion. As a result, estimates of length of processing time associated with the exclusions may
be somewhat lower than the number for all cases terminated during those years. Data for
1980 and 1981 are based upon all terminated cases. This difference may partly explain
the precipitous increase in days excluded for automatic exclusions between 1979 and 1980.
c This figure is a weighted estimate of median days per defendant. The median number of
days per defendant was weighted using the estimates of prevalence reported in Table 3.
The estimated median number of days for Each individual was summed across all time
intervals in order to obtain this composite estimate of the total amount of excluded time.
exclusions and "ends of justice" continuances. Growth in the length of
excluded time, therefore, accompanied increased application of some of
the provisions. As a result, the overall amount of time excluded among
cases increased substantially over the five year period.
Before proceeding further, it may be useful to summarize the find-
ings presented thus far. The increase in compliance with the Act's final
time limits between 1977 and 1981 correlated with increased application
of the Act's automatic exclusions and "ends of justice" continuances.
Improvements in compliance with the time limits over the period re-
sulted partly from increased application of the excluded time provisions
and increased amounts of time excluded in each application. However,
such improvements in compliance may not necessarily reflect actual re-
ductions of delay in cases. The following section examines whether the
improvements prompted reductions in overall case processing time in
federal criminal litigation.
C. EFFECTS OF THE ACT ON DELAY
A stated purpose of the Speedy Trial Act is "to assist in reducing
1982]
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crime and the danger of recidivism by requiring speedy trials." 52 And a
major motivation for passing the Act was widespread concern over the
problem of delay in federal courts.53 But the existence of different meth-
ods for studying delay creates problems for estimating the effects of the
Act on delay. While some writers refer to delay in terms of "court con-
gestion" or "backlog," others refer to it in terms of "excessive" case
processing time or the "pace" of litigation.5 4 Still others differentiate
between "court-system delay" and "lawyer-caused delay" or "filled"
and "significant postponement" time in litigation. 55
Each reference implies a different definition and a different inter-
pretation of delay.56 For example, backlog in courts may generally refer
to the number of cases pending on court calendars. When characterized
in terms of backlog or pending cases, delay is cast as a queuing problem
in which the sire of the queue of pending cases reflects the extensiveness
of delay.57 An alternative approach estimates delay by viewing it in
terms of the time required to process cases. Unlike the size or extent of
backlog, case processing time reflects the rate at which cases flow
through the courts and how long they survive until reaching disposition.
In these terms, delay is a problem of court efficiency in which the length
of time required to process cases reflects the extensiveness of delay.
While observers generally agree that elapsed calendar time most
accurately reflects courts' efficiency in disposing of cases, their views
vary with respect to accurately measuring delays and empirically deter-
mining the amount of processing time that is "excessive. "58
By setting time limits, the Act establishes standards defining exces-
sive processing time. Delay represents case processing time in excess of
the Act's prescribed limits, minus all periods of excluded time and con-
52 Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (1974).
53 See note 1 & accompanying text supra.
54 For a general discussion and review of empirical approaches to study delay in courts,
see T. CHURCH, J. LEE, T. TAN, A. CARLSON & V. MCCONNELL, PRETRIAL DELAY: A
REVIEW AND BIBLIOGRAPHY (1978) [hereinafter cited PRETRIAL DELAY]; L. KATZ, L. LIT-
WIN & R. BAMBERGER, JUSTICE IS THE CRIME: PRETRIAL DELAY IN FELONY CASES (1972);
S. WILDHORN, M. LAVIN & A. PASCAL, INDICATORS OF JUSTICE: MEASURING THE PER-
FORMANCE OF PROSECUTION, DEFENSE, AND COURT AGENCIES INVOLVED IN FELONY PRO-
CEEDINGS: ANALYSIS AND DEMONSTRATION (1977); H. ZEISEL, H. KALVEN & B. BUCHOLZ,
DELAY IN COURT (1977); Church, Who Sets the Place of Litigation in Urban Trial Courts? 65 JUD.
2, 76 (1981); Grossman, Kritzer, Bumiller & McDougal, Measuring the Pace of Civil Litigation in
Federal and State Trial Courts, 65 JUD. 2, 86 (1981); Levin, Delay in Five Criminal Courts, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 83 (1975); Rosenberg & Sovern, Delay and the Dynamics of Personal Inju9' Litiga-
tion, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 1115 (1959); Ryan, Lipetz, Luskin & Neubauer, Analyzing Court Delay
Reduction Programs: Why Do Some Succeed?, 65 JUD. 2, 76 (1981).
55 M. ROSENBERG, THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE LAW EXPLOSION (H. Jones ed.
1965); Rosenberg & Sovern, supra note 54, at 1124-26.
56 See PRETRIAL DELAY, supra note 54, at 1-8.
57 Id. at 1-2.
58 Id. at 3-4.
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tinuances granted in the "ends of justice. ' ' 59 As noted earlier, however,,
the Act's meaning of delay is associated with districts' application of its
provisions for excluded processing time. Thus, delay as measured by the
Act, reflects variation among districts in the application of the provi-
sions; and as a result, delay may significantly vary among courts and
individual cases according to each district's exclusion of case processing
time. Thus, delay may not necessarily measure the actual pace of litiga-
tion but rather disparities among districts in the interpretation and im-
plementation of the Act's statutory scheme.
An alternative approach to measuring delay in criminal cases-and
thus measuring the Act's impact on criminal litigation-is to specify de-
lay in terms of elapsed processing time.60 The extent of delay in individ-
ual cases and, in the aggregate, among courts may be measured in terms
of the average amount of case processing time and how much cases devi-
ate from the average. This approach measures delay by the general
speed of case processing rather than by the application of time limits
and exemptions that may vary significantly among courts. The Act's
effect on delay may be identified by comparing changes in overall case
processing time since implementation of the Act with levels of case
processing time prior to the Act's implementation. To ensure- the com-
parison accurately describes effects of the Act, changes in the types and
disposition of criminal cases processed in federal courts that may influ-
ence overall processing time must also be considered.61
Using plots of the range of case processing times for each year, Fig-
ure 1 shows the trends in elapsed processing time, estimated in days
59 18 U.S.C. § 3161 el. seq. (1979).
60 Recent studies using this approach include T. CHURCH, A. CARLSON, J. LEE, & T.
TAN, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS (1978);
Church, supra note 54; Grossman, Kritzer, Bumiller, & McDougal, supra note 54; Ryan,
Lipetz, Luskin & Neubauer, supra note 54.
61 It is necessary to compare changes in elapsed processing time with changes in the types
and disposition of cases processed in federal courts in order to ascertain whether the changes
in elapsed time stem solely from the Act or perhaps also from changes occurring in the work
of courts over time. See text accompanying notes 65-66 infra.
The number and types of criminal cases prosecuted in federal courts reflect the policies
and practices of the Department of Justice and individual Offices of United States Attorneys.
In 1977, for example, the Attorney General announced that the Department of Justice and
the Offices of United States Attorneys would concentrate their resources on the investigation
and prosecution of complex offenses involving "white-collar" crimes, narcotics violations, or-
ganized crime, and offenses involving corruption of public officials. This change in policy
may have contributed to a substantial decline in criminal cases processed in federal courts.
Examples of policy decisions which affect the federal criminal caseload include: deferral to
state or local authorities of auto thefts when the theft is not connected to organized criminal
activity, deferral of certain offenses that are committed by persons under 21, deferral of cases
involving first time offenders accused of weapons and firearms violations, deferral of bank
robberies, and reduction in prosecution of minors for drug'violations. AD. OFF. OF U. S.
COURTS, ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR 6-7 (1979).
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from filing to disposition, for all criminal cases terminated in federal
courts between 1971 and 1981.62 The figure shows a slight but progres-
sive decline in the median processing time-the midpoint of the distri-
bution of processing time-from 1974 to 1977. And even though the
rate of this decline increased slightly between 1974 and 1975, the intro-
duction of the Act's time limits seemingly did not reduce median levels
of processing time. Indeed, since the time limits became effective in
1977, the median time from filing to disposition has remained almost
constant.
It is possible, however, that the average processing time among
cases would not reflect significant changes in the overall distribution of
case processing time among cases. Because the Act's time limits serve as
upper limits for case processing time rather than standards for average
processing time,63 it is necessary to ascertain whether changes occurred
among cases that terminated only after long periods of time as well as
among cases that terminated relatively quickly. Figure 1 also exhibits
the amount of time from filing to disposition for the "slowest" and "fast-
est" ten percent and twenty-five percent of all cases terminated each
year between 1971 and 1981. While a decline occurs between 1974 and
1977 in processing time among the "fastest" cases terminated each year,
larger progressive declines occurred among the "slowest" cases. Process-
ing time declined steadily among the "slowest" twenty-five percent of all
62 Elapsed time from filing to disposition measures the time between first official court
notice and final disposition, including all time through sentencing for convicted defendants.
Thus, elapsed processing time covers a larger period of processing time than that computed
under the provisions of the Act.
Two concerns arise in comparing aggregate trends in elapsed processing time with aggre-
gate measures of compliance with the Act. The first involves the possible distorting effects of
processing time between sentencing and conviction on elapsed processing time. Aggregate
estimates of elapsed time may vary in part according to the number of defendants sentenced
and the time required to sentence them. To ascertain whether trends in elapsed processing
time presented in Figure 1 correlate with trends in the sentencing of convicted defendants-
that is, trends in the proportion of defendants sentenced or the elapsed time associated with
the sentencing process-the study analyzed statistical trends in the number of convictions and
elapsed time associated with convictions by guilty plea. Analysis of data provided by the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts on defendants to whom the provisions of the Act
apply indicates that no significant changes that would distort interpretation of elapsed
processing time as an appropriate measure of delay occurred between 1974 and 1981 in 1) the
proportion of defendants convicted and sentenced and 2) the median time from filing to
disposition of defendants convicted by guilty pleas.
A second concern involves fugitivity and whether changes in the number of fugitive de-
fendants or elapsed time associated with fugitivity influences overall measures of elapsed
processing time. Limited published statistical data exist on these subjects. Trends in pending
criminal cases between 1977 and 1981 reveal no substantial changes in patterns of fugitivity
that would distort interpretation of overall elapsed processing time.
63 ABT REPORT, supra note 8, at 108.
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FIGURE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF ELAPSED PROCESSING TIME (IN DAYS)
AMONG DEFENDANTS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL
CASES FROM FILING TO DISPOSITION:
1971-1981a
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a Source: Statistics Division, Administrative Office of U.S. Courts. The distributions are
based upon all defendants, excluding defendants in selective service cases and "non-speedy
trial" cases (misdemeanors, juveniles, state court removals, appeals from U.S. magistrate
decisions, Rule 20 transfers out of districts). Defendants in selective service cases were
excluded from the time series because of the dramatic drop in number in 1978.
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cases between 1973 and 1981. And among the "slowest" ten percent,
case processing time has declined since 1976, with an interruption in
1980.
Courts may achieve faster overall processing time such as that ob-
served in Figure 1 by selectively processing fewer "slow" cases and more
"fast" cases. In this instance, faster overall processing would be an arti-
fact of change in the number of "slow" cases rather than change in the
actual pace of litigation. To determine whether the changes in process-
ing time shown in Figure 1 represent such an artifact, the study also
examined changes in the actual rate of case processing between 1971
and 1981. Figure 2 shows the distributions of defendants in criminal
cases terminated for each year in the eleven year trend. Each distribu-
tion in the figure plots the proportion of defendants whose cases contin-
ued over successive intervals of time. The slopes of the eleven
distributions reflect the rates of terminations and the pace of litigation-
a steep slope indicates faster litigation pace than a gradual slope.
Despite the similarity between years the litigation pace progres-
sively increased beginning in 1971 with litigation proceeding at a
slightly faster rate in years following the Act. The greatest differences
between years occurred between 90 and 300 days after filing. In years
following the Act, the proportions of cases continuing through this pe-
riod were slightly smaller than in years prior to the Act.64 Further, in
years following the Act slightly fewer cases continued past 180 days of
filing than in years before the Act.
Several factors may intervene between compliance with the Act's
time limits and case processing time. A relatively slight decline in aver-
age elapsed time may occur despite significant improvements in case
processing resulting from efforts to comply with the Act's provisions.
For example, a substantial increase in the proportion of complex crimi-
nal cases may increase the elapsed time from filing to disposition. Over a
short period of time the increase in complex cases would hide the effects
of reductions in elapsed processing time resulting from increased compli-
ance with the Act. Despite the improvements, cases would generally be
more complex and thus would involve greater average elapsed time than
other types of cases. Similarly, a substantial decrease in the proportion
64 The observation that the proportion of cases terminated between 90 and 300 days
after filing was smaller in years following the Act is based upon comparison of the cumulative
distributions of case terminations across the eleven year trend. The specific proportions of
cases terminated during that period are available from the author on request. The propor-
tions are omitted from the article simply for the purposes of brevity. The source of the infor-
mation is the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, Statistics Division.
[Vol. 73

















70 GEORGE S BRIDGES [Vol. 73
of criminal cases terminated by plea would effectively increase the aver-
age elapsed time from filing to dispostion and would thereby mask the
possible effects of reductions in case processing time. In both examples,
courts and litigants may achieve accelerated dispositions of criminal
cases even though the achievement would not be apparent in measures
of elapsed time.
In order to determine whether findings reported in Figures 1 and 2
correlate with changes in the types and disposition of cases litigated in
the federal courts, the study also examined trends in criminal prosecu-
tions between 1974 and 1981.65 Specific information on defendants in
criminal cases-by category by offense-was not available before 1974.
Table 5 summarizes the nature of cases terminated over the period
TABLE 5
MAJOR CATEGORIES OF CRIMINAL CASES TERMINATED IN
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS BY NATURE OF
DEFENDANT'S OFFENSE, MEDIAN
PROCESSING TIME (IN DAYS) AND DISPOSITION: 1974-1981a
ROBBERY LARCENY AND THEFT EMBEZZLEMENT FRAUD
Total Median Median Median Median
Year Defendants Total % Time %Plea Total % Time %Plea Total % . Time %Piea Total % Time %Plea
1974 45437 1915 4.2 128 56.4 4039 8.9 110 69.0 1785 3.9 97 79.0 3780 8.3 158 64.3
1975 47877 2355 4.9 113 62.1 4790 10.0 94 70.6 1825 3.8 88 82.8 3990 8.3 140 66.8
1976 51112 2710 5.3 113 65.7 5192 10.2 100 70.0 1922 3.8 85 81.3 4791 9.4 131 66.4
1977 49774 2306 4.6 110 69.2 5474 11.0 82 76.6 2110 4.2 82 84.4 5700 11.4 113 71.9
1978 44908 1889 4.2 110 71.1 4932 11.0 85 74.7 2026 4.5 79 84.3 5794 12.9 122 70.2
1979 40349 1496 3.7 110 69.2 4131 10.2 85 73.6 1889 4.7 85 84.0 5988 14.8 110 72.8
1980 35918 1529 4.3 106 71.6 3600 10.0 88 71.3 1589 4.4 85 81.8 5470 15.2 110 69.9
1981 37294 1596 4.2 110 69.8 3586 9.6 91 72.9 1877 5.0 85 84.0 5519 14.7 110 69.2
FORGERY AND COUNTERFEITING DRUGS AND NARCOTICS WEAPONS AND FIREARMS
Total Median Median Median
Year Defendants Total % Time %Plea Total % Time %Plea Total % Time %Plea
1974 45437 4861 10.7 113 75.4 10988 24.2 134 61.0 2742 6.0 113 63.9
1975 47877 5195 10.8 110 77.4 10975 22.9 134 60.0 3299 6.9 113 64.7
1976 51112 5031 9.8 103 73.8 10885 21.3 131 59.0 3438 6.7 110 63.5
1977 49774 4623 9.2 97 80.6 9460 19.0 131 62.9 3072 6.1 97 69.1
1978 44908 4628 10.3 100 81.3 7773 17.3 140 58.3 3299 7.3 100 67.9
1979 40349 3915 9.7 103 80.9 6590 16.3 137 56.6 1969 4.9 131 64.2
1980 35918 2744 7.6 106 78.8 6332 17.6 140 55.5 1151 3.2 116 59.3
1981 37294 2338 6.3 l10 78.6 7062 18.9 140 54.9 1401 3.7 113 65.8
Source: Statistics Division, Administrative Office of U.S. Courts. Information on defendants in criminal cases to which the
provisions of the Act apply-by category of offense--was not available for years before 1974. The total number of cases available
each year for this part of the analysis is slightly less than that reported in previous tables because information on the nature of the
offense was not available for a small number of offenss each year. There is no evidence that the analysis is unrepresentative as a
result of this missing information.
65 If the nature and types of cases became more complex over time and required more
time from filing to disposition, improvements in case processing associated with efforts to
achieve compliance with the Act's time limits would be hidden in aggregate measures of case
processing time.
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showing the overall frequency, method of disposition, and elapsed time
associated with processing each of the major categories of offenses.
Three findings are important. First, the total number of defendants
in criminal cases in federal courts declined between 1974 and 1980-the
number progressively declined between 1976 and 1980. The number
increased slightly in 1981. Second, the relative proportion of defendants
charged with acts of fraud increased substantially over the eight year
period, rising from eight percent to almost fifteen percent of all cases
processed. Fraud cases may be more complex and generally involve
greater processing time than many other types of criminal cases in fed-
eral courts.66 Thus, the decline in criminal cases prosecuted in federal
courts may correlate with an increase in the prosecution of complex
cases.
A third trend involves the method of disposition and median time
for processing criminal cases. The use of guilty pleas in five of the seven
types of offenses increased over the eight year trend. Between 1977 and
1980, however, use of guilty pleas declined in weapons and firearms
cases, drugs and narcotics cases, and larceny and theft cases. Further,
the median processing time among defendants charged in those cases
increased slightly. The decline in the use of guilty pleas and this in-
crease in processing time may reflect a general increase in the complex-
ity of litigation in those types of cases.
These trends shed little light on the distributions of elapsed process-
ing time shown in Figures 1 and 2. While the increased complexity of
criminal litigation after 1977 may have complicated efforts to comply
with the Act, the substantial decline in defendants over the same period
probably lightened the burden of compliance. Although it is not possi-
ble to determine statistically the effects of such opposite trends on
elapsed processing time, it is likely that the effects partly offset each
other and thereby minimize the overall role of changes in the nature of
criminal litigation on trends in elapsed processing time.
IV. SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATION
The federal justice system achieved relatively high levels of compli-
ance with the Act's time limits during the past five years. A steady in-
crease in levels of compliance with the Act's final time limits occurred
over this period. Perhaps because the increase was closely associated
with increased application of the Act's provisions for excluded process-
ing time, elapsed time in processing most criminal cases changed little
66 See T. DUNGWORTH & J. HAUSNER, ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES TO U.S. ArTOR-
NEYS' OFFIcES: A CASE WEiCHTIN APPROACH (1979).
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during the period. The median elapsed time among all criminal cases
from filing to disposition was relatively constant between 1977 and 1981,
and a major decline in elapsed processing time occurred only among the
slowest cases handled in federal courts.
These findings undermine observers' concern that litigants and
courts could not comply with the Act's statutory scheme. Most criminal
cases were processed within the Act's time limits during the five year
period. This is particularly significant because the dismissal sanction
was effective only during the final year of the five year period. Thus,
there was no threat in four of the five years that criminal actions would
be dismissed for failure to meet the time limits. Imposition of the sanc-
tion resulted in even higher levels of compliance. Clearly, prosecutors,
defense counsel and courts effectively adapted to the threat posed by the
dismissal sanction.
Because improvements in compliance during the implementation
period were partly realized through application of the Act's provision
for excluded time, courts and litigants have achieved less with respect to
the speedy trial goal. Time required to process most criminal cases
changed little following passage of the Act. This result may stem from
the general interests of litigants and courts in delay as well as their reac-
tion to perceived consequences or "costs" associated with achieving the
speedy trial goal. Some observers suggest those perceived costs may in-
clude heightened pressures for prosecutors to decline minor criminal
cases, less thorough defense preparation and more frequent and longer
delays in civil cases.67 Among the costs, delays in civil cases have per-
haps received greatest attention in writing on the Act. 68
67 For a general review and discussion of the Act's impact on federal civil litigation, see
Fordham Study, supra note 1, at 652-59; see also ABT REPORT, supra note 8, at 101-18; Misner,
supra note 1.
68 As part of the 1979 amendments to the Act, for example, Congress explicitly required
that the Department of Justice report on "the impact of compliance with the time limits in
subsection (b) and (c) of § 3161 upon the litigation of civil cases by the Offices of United
States Attorneys and the rule changes, statutory amendments and resources necessary to as-
sure that such litigation is not prejudiced by full compliance with [the Act]." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3167(c)(5) (1979).
Many observers, including federal judges, have expressed fears that the imposition of the
Act's time limits and dismissal sanction would result in a dramatic increase in the volume of
pending civil cases. As expressed by Judge Feikens in the 1974 House hearings on the Act:
[I]f we have to put all our attention on criminal cases, we will not reach our civil
docket. I am in danger right now of that. . . . [I]fyou say to us "now put these criminal
cases front and center at the exclusion of the civil cases," we can do that, but the civil
litigants are going to suffer.
Hearings on S 754, HR. 7873, HR 207, HR. 658, H. 687, H. 773, andHR. 4807, Before the
Subcomm. on Crime ofthe House Comm. on theJudicia, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 241 (1974).
Two recent studies of the Act's impact on civil litigation across all federal districts indi-
cates that the Act has had no independent effect on the volume or flow of civil litigation in
federal courts. See ABT REPORT, supra note 8, at 102-18; AD. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS,
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Compliance with the Act's provisions may be viewed as placing an
unwelcome burden on prosecutors, defense attorneys and federal courts.
This study indicates that litigants and courts may have lessened the per-
ceived burden of achieving substantial reductions in delays in criminal
cases complying with the Speedy Trial Act's time limits through fre-
quent and effective application of the Act's provisions for excluded
time.6
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SIXTH REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TrrLE I OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974,
C1-C16 (1980).
69 This interpretation is supported by research on delay in litigation in state courts that
suggests efforts to reduce litigation delay encounter 1) opposition to those efforts among par-
ticipants in litigation and 2) the belief among the participants that externally imposed
changes in litigation may be improper and unfair. Many writers believe that in every com-
munity a "local legal culture" exists within which there exists a shared set of values regarding
the conduct and pace of litigation. The imposition of a new set of values, such as standards
mandated by the Speedy Trial Act, may contradict existing values of the legal culture and be
viewed as placing an unwelcome burden on participants in legal proceedings. See T.
CHURCH, supra note 54; T. CHURCH, A. CARLSON, J. LEE & T. TAN, sutpra note 60; Ryan,
Lipset, Luskin & Neubauer, supra note 54.
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